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A B S T R A C T
Despite increasing communication efforts, it may be difficult for central banks to engage the
public, as their language is often too difficult to understand for most citizens. Focusing on the
case of the European Central Bank (ECB), we hypothesise that greater communication clarity is
conducive to stronger engagement. We rely on readability metrics to measure the clarity of ECB
communications. We show that communication clarity is a significant and robust predictor of
the media engagement generated by the ECB with its speeches, press conferences and tweets.
Our findings are validated by a placebo test and have significant policy implications for central
bank communication.
. Introduction
Central bank communication has changed radically over the last decade. Since the Global Financial Crisis, the communication
ctivities of central banks have grown exponentially in volume and have become more targeted at the general public (Haldane 2017).
onetheless, despite increasing communication efforts, there remains a widespread perception that central banks communicate in
way that most households cannot understand. As Bank of England Chief economist Andrew Haldane put it on several occasions,
‘around 95% of all the words central banks utter are inaccessible to around 95% of the population’’ (Haldane 2018). This lack of
larity in the public communications of central banks is regarded as a major form of hindrance for these institutions to successfully
ngage the public and close the ‘‘twin deficit’’ of public understanding and trust in economics (Haldane et al. 2020).
Economic research has provided evidence for a range of positive implications of the clarity of central bank communication on the
ehaviour and expectations of financial market actors (e.g., Jansen 2011a; Montes et al. 2016; Smales and Apergis 2017; Montes
nd Nicolay 2017). Moreover, economists have increasingly studied the determinants and consequences of public attention and
erceptions related to monetary policy by analysing media coverage on central banks (e.g., Berger et al. 2011; Binder 2017; Bennani
018; Istrefi 2019a; Bennani 2020). Yet, we still know very little about the effects of central bank communication clarity on public
ttention and engagement. Focusing on the case of the ECB, this paper fills the gap by asking the following research question: does
ommunication clarity make central banks more engaging?
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The article addresses this question by analysing a comprehensive dataset of ECB speeches, press conferences and tweets using
eadability metrics (Flesch 1948; Gunning 1952; Kincaid et al. 1975). We follow previous studies that have used language complexity
s a proxy of (lack of) communication clarity, and assess its impact on media engagement, focusing on both traditional and social
edia. We show that greater complexity (i.e., lower clarity) of ECB speeches and press conferences is significantly and robustly
orrelated with lower levels of media coverage on the ECB at the time in which these communication events take place. Also, we
rovide evidence that the clarity of ECB digital communications is a strong predictor of the social media engagement generated by
he central bank on Twitter.
In carrying out these analyses, we control for several potential confounders, such as the topics of discussion and number of
peeches on a given day, the presence of conventional and unconventional policy changes during a press conference, and the
opics and media content of ECB tweets. Following a burgeoning literature employing text mining techniques to analyse the
ontent of central bank communications (e.g., Baerg and Lowe 2020; Cross and Greene 2020; Ferrara 2020), we use supervised
nd unsupervised machine learning models to extract topics from the textual content of ECB speeches and tweets.
Moreover, we perform a placebo test for speeches and press conferences to ensure that our results are not driven by a phenomenon
f reverse causality in which the level of the treatment (i.e., communication clarity) is affected by the pre-treatment level of the
utcome variable (i.e., media engagement). Finally, we test the robustness of our results to different model specifications and
perationalisations of communication clarity. Taken together, these findings contribute to a lively debate on the appropriate balance
etween different features of central bank communication (e.g., Bholat et al. 2019; Istrefi 2019b) and have significant implications,
specially in light of the ongoing review of the ECB’s policy strategy.
The next section reviews major contributions on communication clarity and develops the argument we test in our empirical
nalysis. The third section discusses the data and methods employed in the paper. The fourth section presents the results of
ur analysis. The fifth section performs the placebo test and provides robustness checks. The final section highlights the policy
mplications of our findings and points to future avenues for research.
. The effects of communication clarity
A common observation in the academic and public debate is that, in many ways, the styles of discourse are changing radically in
ontemporary public communications. While the challenges of policy-making have grown in complexity over the past decades, the
ophistication of public speech has declined. For example, scholars across disciplines have applied measures of textual complexity
eveloped in the field of education to find that the sophistication of the speeches given by American presidents has steadily decreased
ver the past 200 years (e.g., Sigelman 1996; Teten 2003; Lim 2008). Political scientists and social psychologists have advanced
ignificantly in the study of the determinants and effects of linguistic complexity in political communication (e.g., Spirling 2016; Lin
nd Osnabrügge 2018; Bischof and Senninger 2018; Schoonvelde et al. 2019; Benoit et al. 2019; Rauh et al. 2020).
Scholarly interest in communication clarity has not remained limited to the domain of political communication. This topic
s particularly relevant for central banks. A long-standing debate in economics has focused on what constitutes an optimal
ommunication strategy for central banks (for a review, see Blinder et al. 2008). Within this body of research, several studies
ave argued that communication clarity constitutes a key element of central bank transparency (e.g., Winkler 2000; Fracasso et al.
003; Jansen 2011b). The clarity of the communication activities of central banks has been increasingly measured by applying
he same metrics of textual complexity developed in education studies (e.g., Flesch 1948; Gunning 1952; Kincaid et al. 1975) and
sed by political science and psychology scholars to evaluate the complexity of political speeches. Most of the literature studying
he consequences of the clarity of central bank communication employs these measures and points to significant effects of clarity
n steering financial market expectations and reducing volatility (e.g., Jansen 2011a; Smales and Apergis 2017; Montes et al.
016; Montes and Nicolay 2017).1
Economists have paid less attention to the effects of the clarity of central bank communication beyond the realm of financial
arkets. As argued by Haldane and McMahon (2018), one reason why central banks may want to communicate more directly with
he general public is to address the ‘‘twin deficits’’ of public understanding and trust in economics. To achieve higher levels of
rust and understanding, it may not be sufficient to simply increase the quantity of communications with the public. Haldane et al.
2020) contend that, for central bank communication to have an impact, it is important that households and businesses engage with
t. Despite the increasing volumes of central bank communication with the public, the technical language used by central bankers
ay constitute an obstacle to effectively engage the public. As Haldane (2017), Coenen et al. (2017) and Haldane and McMahon
2018) show, the main publications of central banks in many advanced economies present a level of complexity that makes them
oo difficult to understand for about 90% of the general public.
In spite of the evidence highlighting that central bank communication is often too difficult to understand for the average
itizen, whether central bank communication clarity has an effect on engagement remains a blind spot in economic research.
here are good reasons to hypothesise this is the case. For instance, recent evidence from experimental research supports the idea
hat low levels of clarity constitute a key obstacle for central bank communication to have a direct impact on public attitudes,
xpectations and behaviour. Haldane and McMahon (2018) employ survey experiments to provide evidence that clearer and simpler
1 Notwithstanding the potentially positive effects of clear communication on financial markets, it is interesting to observe that clarity of communications by
everal central banks decreased during the financial crisis, as documented by Bulir et al. (2012). However, a clear answer to the question of what drives the2
larity of central bank communication has yet to be found (Bulir et al. 2013).















communications about inflation increase individuals’ understanding of the communicated messages, improve attitudes towards the
communicating central bank, and generate greater alignment between individuals’ inflation expectations and central bank forecasts.
Furthermore, Bholat et al. (2019) make use of online experiments to show that public comprehension of, and trust in, central banks
can be improved if communications are made more relatable to people’s daily lives.
As Haldane et al. (2020) put it, for households and businesses to engage with the communication of central banks, ‘‘they need to
ead or see it and they need to take the message on board’’. That points to the role of the media as the main vehicle of the messages
f central banks to the public. For these reasons, the analysis of this paper focuses on media engagement as a proxy for public
ngagement. In doing so, we follow previous research, most notably Lamla and Sturm (2013), and see media as a fundamental
ransmitter of news to the public. Media engagement can be regarded as a necessary condition for central bank communication to
xert an effect on public perceptions and decisions: if journalists and social media users do not pick up on the messages of central
anks, it is reasonable to expect the communications of monetary institutions to have little leeway to reach the general public
nd influence its expectations and behaviour. In particular, while economists have traditionally focused on the effects of central
ank communication on financial markets (e.g., Jansen and de Haan 2007; Rosa and Verga 2007; Rozkrut et al. 2007; Neuenkirch
012; Büchel 2013; Anderes et al. 2021), household inflation expectations have increasingly become one of the main targets of
entral bank communication, as well as the object of a burgeoning strand of research in the field of central banking (e.g., Lyziak
nd Paloviita 2017; de Haan and Sturm 2019; Coibion et al. 2019; Coibion et al. 2019; Baerg et al. 2021).
We consider two dimensions of media engagement, which provide us with two different measures of public attention and action.
irst, we consider traditional media coverage, namely the amount of articles written by journalists. This provides us with a measure
f how much the public is exposed to the messages of the central bank. Second, we analyse user behaviour on social media, which offers
n indication of how much the public reacts to the messages of the central bank. We see the disintermediated context of social media
as an appropriate setting to evaluate the degree of public response to central bank communications in a more direct fashion.
Media coverage on central banks has increasingly captured the attention of economic researchers, and our research endeavour
builds on several studies in the economic literature. As pointed out by Bennani (2020), ECB media coverage can affect the economic
perceptions of a wide range of actors, thereby shaping their expectations and behaviour. This is especially true for the general
public, as the media is a cost-effective source to update the information sets under the tight informational constraints to which
ordinary citizens are subject (Sims 2003). Previous research has shown that media coverage has a significant impact on interest
rate expectations (Lamla and Sturm 2013), inflation expectations (Lamla and Lein 2014; Lamla and Lein 2015), and public support
for the ECB (Hayo and Neuenkirch 2014). Moreover, Bennani (2018) shows that the ECB acts more dovishly in response to higher
uncertainty expressed in ECB media coverage. Focusing on the US context, Istrefi (2019a) quantifies public perceptions of the policy
preferences of Federal Open Market Committee members based on newspapers and business reports of Fed watchers, while Bennani
(2020) provides evidence that investor sentiment is responsive to media portrayals of the Fed chair as confident and optimistic.
Finally, Berger et al. (2011) and Binder (2017) have provided detailed assessment of how traditional media coverage responds to
the communication activities of, respectively, the ECB and the Federal Reserve.
Despite the increasing scholarly interest in media coverage on central banks, previous studies have so far presented very little
evidence that the attention of journalists and social media users to the communications of central banks is conditioned by the clarity
of central bank communication. One exception is given by Haldane et al. (2020, 36-38), who compare the online media reach of the
November 2017 Bank of England Inflation Report, which introduced simplified, layered content, with two counterfactual reports
that presented no simplified content. Their analysis offers descriptive evidence suggesting that simpler communications may foster
the engagement generated by central banks.
Drawing from this strand of economic research and from studies in the field of consumer psychology showing that readability
shapes social media engagement (e.g., Leonhardt and Makienko 2017; Pancer et al. 2019), this paper offers the first systematic
assessment of a link between clarity and engagement in the realm of central bank communication. It does so by focusing on the
communication activities of the ECB. The next section presents the data and methods we employ to shed light on the effects of the
ECB’s clarity of communication with the public.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Measuring clarity of communications
Does the clarity of ECB communication activities shape public attention and engagement? To answer this question, we first have
to illustrate how clarity is operationalised. We measure communication clarity using two readability metrics: the Flesch–Kincaid
Grade Level and the Gunning-Fog Index. Both metrics attempt to measure how easy it is to read a piece of text and are based on
word length and sentence length. The Flesch–Kincaid (F–K) Grade Level derives from the Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) Test (Flesch
1948) and provides a score that can be interpreted as the number of years of education generally required to understand a text. The
higher the score, the greater the complexity (i.e., the lower is the clarity) of the language used. The measure is calculated using the
following formula (Kincaid et al. 1975):
































Different from the F–K Grade Level, the Gunning-Fog (FOG) Index takes into account the number of complex words, rather than
total syllables. Complex words are defined as those words with three or more syllables2 and that are not proper nouns, familiar
words, or compound nouns. Thus, the FOG Index differs from the F–K Grade Level inasmuch as it relies on vocabulary-based features,
namely word categories (e.g., familiar words, proper nouns, etc.) as operationalised by pre-specified lists. The metric is calculated
based on the following formula (Gunning 1952):










Initially developed in the field of education research, these measures have been applied in a wide array of other fields, ranging
rom medicine (e.g., Paasche-Orlow et al. 2003) to journalism (e.g., Wasike 2018), and including many studies in economics
e.g., Jansen 2011a; Bulir et al. 2014; Montes et al. 2016; Smales and Apergis 2017) and political science (e.g., Spirling 2016; Lin
nd Osnabrügge 2018; Schoonvelde et al. 2019; Rauh et al. 2020).
To be sure, the application of readability metrics has not remained uncontested. Recently, there have been different cross-
isciplinary attempts to produce more sophisticated measures of comprehension difficulty of text. For instance, Benoit et al. (2019)
ave introduced a new domain-specific approach to measuring sophistication through complexity in political texts. Their approach
elies on crowdsourcing for the evaluation of textual difficulty and considers a wider set of features, such as word rarity, measured
ith dynamic term frequencies derived from the Google Books dataset.
Despite these recent advancements and challenges to standard measures of textual complexity, the FRE Test, the F–K Grade Level
nd the FOG Index remain widely used in the social science literature for good reasons. For example, as Schoonvelde et al. (2019)
oint out, Benoit et al. (2019) find the FRE Test to be a crucial predictor of sophistication in political texts: with that measure alone,
t is possible to correctly predict 72% of the human coders’ judgements of difficult text snippets in their study. The introduction of
arious additional text features only marginally improves the prediction capacity of the FRE Test alone.
Thus, we follow the approach adopted by most social science studies analysing language complexity, namely we employ the
–K Grade Level, which is based on the same features of the FRE Test.3 We then validate our results with the FOG Index in the
robustness checks. Making use of these two metrics, we analyse the communication of the ECB across three different activities. First,
we consider the speeches given by the members of the ECB Executive Board and Supervisory Board.4 Second, we take into account
the monetary policy press conferences held by the ECB President following the meetings of the ECB Governing Council. Third, we
study the digital communications of the ECB on Twitter.5
3.2. ECB communications and traditional media engagement
3.2.1. ECB speeches
For ECB speeches, we use a dataset containing all the monetary policy and banking supervision speeches given by ECB Executive
Board and Supervisory Board members from January 1999 to October 2019 (i.e., from the beginning of the Presidency of Wim
Duisenberg to the end of the Presidency of Mario Draghi), for a total of 2175 measurable speeches which occurred on 1655 days.
For days in which more than one speech was given, we consider the average score of all the speeches given on that day.
Table A1 in Online Appendix A provides the summary statistics of all the variables used in the speech analysis, including the
daily communication clarity of ECB speeches based on the measures of textual complexity discussed above. The mean F–K Grade
Level of ECB speeches is 14.4, which falls inside the range of complexity identified by Haldane and McMahon (2018), who claim
that typical central bank publications have a F–K Grade Levels of 14–18 (roughly equivalent to college-level education). Given the
levels of literacy across the population, this makes the average speech of the ECB inaccessible to at least 90% of the general public.
The summary statistics of Table A1, however, conceal some interesting degree of variation in communication clarity. Fig. 1 shows
the evolution of the F–K Grade Level in the corpus of ECB speeches from 1999 to 2019. Higher values on the 𝑦-axis correspond to
higher levels of complexity (i.e., lower levels of clarity). Data points for speeches given by Executive Board members are indicated
by the light blue colour, while those of Supervisory Board members are coloured in red. Also shown in the graph is the Board-specific
conditional mean of the readability score.
The graph displays a significant degree of variation in the communication clarity of the ECB over time, with two patterns worth
highlighting. First, speeches of ECB Executive Board members have become clearer after the onset of the euro crisis in 2010. Before
2 Common suffixes are not counted as syllables; e.g., -ed, -ing, etc.
3 The only difference between the FRE Test and F–K Grade Level is that the latter produces a Grade Level rather than a score between 0 and 100.
4 The Executive Board is the decision-making body that is responsible to implement monetary policy for the euro area, while the Supervisory Board plans
nd carries out the tasks of the ECB in the field of banking supervision. Both decision-making bodies have six ECB representatives (a President/Chair, a Vice-
resident/Vice-Chair and four other members). Similar to the Governing Council, which consists of the six members of the Executive Board plus the governors
f the national central banks of the 19 euro area countries, the Supervisory Board has six ECB representatives plus representatives of national supervisory
uthorities. Our analysis focuses on the speeches given by ECB representatives.
5 Other studies, such as Bennani et al. (2020), have also considered the content of press interviews in their analysis of central bank communication with
he public. In our paper, we decide to focus on speeches, press conferences and tweets for reasons of data availability, composition and comprehensiveness.
ndeed, not all interviews given by the ECB President and Board members are published on the ECB’s website. At the time of the writing, the press interviews
n the website of the ECB are available only from 2004, with the amount of communication activities being extremely low in the pre-crisis period (e.g., only4
ix interviews in 2004 and 2006). We leave the extension of our analysis to assess the impact of communication clarity in ECB interviews for future work.








Fig. 1. Complexity in ECB speeches, 1999–2019 (F–K Grade Level). Notes: This figure displays the F–K Grade Level value of all the speeches given by the
members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of the ECB from 1999 to 2019, together with Board-specific conditional means. Higher (lower)
values indicate a greater degree of communication complexity (clarity). Conditional means show 95% confidence intervals.
that moment, the F–K Grade Level remained, on average, above 15, a degree of clarity that is accessible only to individuals who have
graduate-level college education. After 2010, the level of complexity remains very high, but falls below 15. Second, the average F–K
Grade Level of Supervisory Board members has been much lower than that of Executive Board members.6 A significant portion of
Supervisory Board members’ speeches score below 10, thereby being more easily accessible also to non-college educated individuals.
In the estimation of the relationship between communication clarity and media engagement presented in Section 4, we control
for potential confounding factors in the analysis. Clearly, one of the most important confounders is given by the topics addressed
by each speech. It might be that speeches focused on certain technical issues about monetary policy and banking supervision are
inherently more complex than speeches related to general interest topics, such as euro coins and banknotes. To account for these
differences in the topics of discussion, in line with recent studies using topic modelling to analyse speeches related to monetary
policy (see also Ferrara et al. 2021), we make use of a Structural Topic Model (STM) to obtain estimates of the distribution of topics
in each speech, which we include as a control variable in our analysis. The procedure to extract topics from speeches and the output
of STM is described in detail in Online Appendix B.
3.2.2. ECB press conferences
Regarding press conferences, our dataset includes the text from the introductory statement and the Q&A session with journalists
for each press conference given by the ECB President from January 1999 to October 2019. This yields a text corpus of 225 press
conferences. Table A3 in Online Appendix A presents the summary statistics for this dataset. The table also provides separate figures
for the clarity of the introductory statement (IS) portion of the text, which usually follows a regular technical structure, and the
transcript of the Q&A session, which is typically less structured and technical in its content.7 The average level of complexity in
6 Sabine Lautenschläger was both member of the ECB Executive Board and Vice-Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board from 2014 to 2019. Since her speeches
ocused mostly on banking supervision and were produced by the speechwriting unit of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, her speeches are classified as belonging
o the Supervisory Board in Fig. 1.
7 The textual data of the Q&A session includes both the questions posed by the journalists and the answers given by the President. Our decision not to
emove the content of journalists’ questions is driven by both technical and substantive reasons. Technically, due to the over time variation in the structure of
he HTML documents of ECB press conferences, the removal of the journalist questions is difficult to automatise and would require a lengthy (and potentially
rone-to-error) manual process to separate questions and answers. Substantively, it is important to note that the complexity of the ECB’s answers may be partly
ndogenous to the clarity of journalists’ questions. Thus, we prefer to minimise the amount of pre-processing operations and keep the full content of the Q&A5
ession in our analysis.






























Fig. 2. Complexity in ECB press conferences, 1999–2019 (F–K Grade Level). Notes: This figure displays the F–K Grade Level value of all ECB press conferences
rom 1999 to 2019, together with Presidency-specific conditional means. Higher (lower) values indicate a greater degree of communication complexity (clarity).
onditional means show 95% confidence intervals.
ress conferences is lower than that of speeches (i.e., the level of clarity is higher). Importantly, the higher level of clarity in press
onferences is driven by the Q&A session, which accounts for the greatest part of the press conference and whose mean F–K Grade
evel is 11. Instead, the IS has a F–K Grade Level above 15, more in line with the level of complexity of ECB speeches.
Fig. 2 shows the over-time evolution of complexity in ECB press conferences, distinguishing between different Presidency terms.
he F–K Grade Level is here based on both the ECB introductory statement and the Q&A with the journalists. Presidency-specific
onditional means are presented with 95% confidence intervals. The graph shows an increasing trend in communication complexity
rom 2003 to 2009. Then, communication clarity has significantly improved during the euro crisis. Starting from late 2014, namely
round the time of the activation of the ECB Asset Purchase Programme, there is again an upward trend in communication
omplexity. This is followed by a reduction in 2018 and 2019, with the interesting outlier of the press conference of September
019, which reaches the highest level of complexity in the sample.
In estimating the effect of press conference clarity on media engagement, we control for the announcement of policy changes on
he day of the press conference. Moreover, we attempt to control for the informational content of ECB press conferences by including
rice changes during the 90-minute window of the communication event. This is important in light of recent studies providing
vidence that the textual content of ECB press conferences affects asset prices and market participants’ ability to predict future
onetary policy decisions (e.g., Parle 2021; Baranowski et al. 2021). In Online Appendix C, we describe and discuss the control
ariables we employ in the analysis of ECB press conferences. These control variables are based on the timeline of ECB monetary
olicy measures developed by Hartmann and Smets (2018, 96) and the ‘‘Euro Area Monetary Policy Database’’ by Altavilla et al.
2019).
.2.3. Traditional media engagement
To evaluate the impact of the clarity of ECB speeches and press conferences on engagement, we make use of a novel dataset of
ews articles mentioning the ECB, retrieved from the digital archive of Dow Jones Factiva. We employ the Data, News and Analytics
DNA) service: DNA is a platform that draws together more than 8000 premium content sources within the Dow Jones ecosystem
nd licenced third-party publishers. Different from the standard Factiva archive, the content of Dow Jones DNA is licenced for
ext-mining and machine-learning use cases. Using a simple query search based on the keyword ‘‘ECB’’, we extract the universe of
nglish articles mentioning the ECB from 1999 to 2019 in Dow Jones DNA archive. This yields a corpus of 1,588,296 news articles
roduced by more than 3000 English news sources across the world.
Fig. 3 provides a visualisation of the over-time evolution of the monthly volume of ECB-related articles in the considered time
eriod. Figure A1 in Online Appendix A displays the amount of ECB coverage by news source, focusing on those media outlets
hat have published at least 5000 articles mentioning the ECB in the 1999–2019 period.8 To verify that the composition of sources
8 It is worth noting that many of the sources frequently referring to the ECB in our dataset are newswire agencies. Despite being often targeted more at
pecialised audiences, these outlets can still be seen as quite relevant for measuring public engagement, as communication research shows that news articles in6
raditional and, especially, online media are highly reliant on agency content (see Boumans et al. 2018).


























Fig. 3. Volume of English articles mentioning the ECB by year, 1999–2019. Notes: This figure displays the monthly volumes of ECB articles from Dow Jones
activa DNA Archive in 1999–2019 period. The colour scale variation is proportional to the monthly volume of media coverage.
emains broadly stable throughout the investigation period, Figure A2 in Online Appendix A shows the yearly volumes of coverage
f the most prevalent source in the dataset (i.e., Reuters News) from 1999 to 2019. The figure displays a relative over time stability,
ith Reuters News’s coverage mounting during the global financial crisis and the euro crisis, and returning to pre-crisis levels after
015. Summary statistics of the volumes of coverage around ECB speeches and press conferences are presented in Tables A2 and
3 in Online Appendix A.
.3. ECB tweets and social media engagement
Regarding ECB digital communications, we rely on a novel dataset of all the tweets posted by the ECB Twitter account from
anuary 2016 to July 2019, for a total of 6276 tweets. The data were retrieved from the Analytics Dashboard of the Twitter account of
he ECB. The dataset contains information about each tweet’s engagements (i.e., the amount of any type of Twitter users’ interaction
ith the tweet, namely the sum of likes, replies, retweets, and any type of user click on the tweet), impressions (i.e., the amount of
imes the tweet has appeared in the timeline of Twitter users), and media content (i.e., the presence of pictures or videos embedded
n the tweet). Other tweet features, such as the topic of the tweet, have been manually coded for a sub-sample of the dataset
n=1790). The topic classification is based on eight categories (i.e., Monetary Policy, Banking Supervision, Euro Currency, Financial
tability, Human Resources, Markets & Payments, Statistics, Other).
The main dependent variable we use to measure social media engagement is the engagement rate of ECB tweets. The engagement








Table A4 in Online Appendix A provides summary statistics of the measures of (lack of) communication clarity in ECB tweets,
s well as of engagements, impressions and engagement rate at the time of the data retrieval (i.e., November 2019). Fig. 4 provides
visualisation of the monthly evolution of the average engagement rate of ECB tweets.
In the analysis, we control for the topic of each tweet. Since only a subset of the corpus of ECB tweets has been manually coded,
e rely on a supervised machine learning algorithm to automatically extend the topic classification to each non-coded tweet. In
articular, we employ Support Vector Machines (SVM) to classify the topic of all tweets in our dataset. The procedure we follow is
escribed in detail in Online Appendix D, which also provides performance metrics of our SVM classifier.
. Results
Does communication clarity increase public attention towards the messages sent by the ECB? In this section, we shed light on
he effects of the clarity of ECB communications on traditional and social media engagement. We perform three sets of analyses.
First, we consider the relationship between the complexity of a given ECB speech and the sum of ECB-related articles published
n day 𝑡 in which the speech is delivered and day 𝑡+1 after the speech. Thus, our initial dependent variable is the two-day volume
f articles about the ECB retrieved from the Dow Jones DNA archive. Considering a two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window allows us to avoid7
making assumptions about exactly when during the event window journalists write, and media outlets publish, articles generated




























Fig. 4. Engagement rate of ECB tweets by month, 2016–2019. Notes: This figure displays the monthly average engagement rate of ECB tweets from the ECB
witter Account in 2016–2019 period. The colour scale variation is proportional to the engagement score.
y the ECB speech.9 In Section 5, we disaggregate this time window and show that our results are robust when using daily volumes
n day 𝑡 and day 𝑡 + 1 separately as dependent variables.
Before performing our analysis, some adjustments to the data are needed. In our dataset, there are 1655 days in which at least
ne speech was given by an ECB Board member. In 409 of these 1655 days more than one ECB speech was given. For these 409
ays, we take the average Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level of all the speeches that were held on the same day as the main independent
ariable in our analysis. Similarly, as a control variable, we consider the average topic proportions from all the speeches that were
iven on the same day. Additionally, we include a dummy variable to control for days in which a speech was given by the ECB
resident and a variable indicating the number of ECB speeches occurring on each day. Finally, to control for the sender type and
iscriminate between speeches of the Executive Board and those of the Supervisory Board, we introduce a dummy variable for days
n which at least one SSM speech was given.
The dependent variable in our analysis is a discrete variable, whose distribution is limited to non-negative values. As shown in
igure A3 in Online Appendix A, the distribution of the volume of articles about the ECB is highly skewed, with most days having a
elatively low volume of ECB coverage and few days exhibiting a disproportionately higher one. As a result, the volume of coverage
s not normally distributed and the variance of the distribution is higher than its mean. Hence, we model the relationship between
peech features and media engagement using a negative binomial model. As robustness checks, in Section 5, we carry out the same
nalysis using ordinary least squares models and show that the results are not particularly sensitive to the model selection.
Table 1 presents marginal effects from negative binomial models in which the two-day volume of media coverage is regressed
nto the F–K Grade Level of ECB speeches. Table A7 in Online Appendix E presents the full set of estimated coefficients. In column
1), the model includes only the measure of clarity of ECB speeches on day 𝑡 based on the F–K Grade Level, together with a constant.
n column (2), we add topic proportions as controls for the different types of content of ECB speeches, using the ‘‘Conventional
onetary Policy’’ topic as a reference category. In column (3), we add controls for days in which the President gave a speech and
or the number of speeches given on day 𝑡. In column (4), we add time fixed effects, using factor variables for the day of the week,
he month and the year in which speeches were given. All models use robust standard errors.
The results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between speech complexity and media coverage of the ECB.
hat is, communication clarity is positively associated with higher volumes of ECB-related news articles. The easier it is to understand
speech given by an ECB Board member, the more likely it is that journalists write about the ECB. The inclusion of controls for
opics, presidential speeches and number of speeches produces only a slight reduction in the magnitude of the estimated coefficient
nd in the t-statistic of the F–K Grade Level variable. The inclusion of time fixed effects contributes to a further reduction in the
agnitude of the estimated effect of the main independent variable, which, however, remains statistically significant at the 5%
9 For instance, if an ECB speech is delivered late in the afternoon of day 𝑡, it is reasonable to expect most of the speech-related news articles to be published8
n day 𝑡 + 1.














ECB speech complexity and media engagement: Marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1
Flesh–Kincaid (Speeches) −31.336*** −31.570*** −29.560*** −7.933**
(−5.49) (−4.64) (−4.39) (−2.23)
Observations 1,655 1,655 1,655 1,655
Topics   
Additional controls  
Time fixed effects 
Marginal effects from negative binomial models. t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table 2
ECB press conference complexity and media engagement: Marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1 Vt+Vt+1
Flesch–Kincaid (All PC) −104.091* −129.678** −117.109*** −101.618** −63.813**
(−1.91) (−2.44) (−2.60) (−2.40) (−2.50)
Flesch–Kincaid (Only IS) −11.247
(−0.33)
Flesch–Kincaid (Only Q&A) −57.422***
(−2.84)
Observations 225 225 225 223 223 223 223
Conventional policy change      
Unconventional policy change     
Asset price changes    
Time fixed effects   
Marginal effects from negative binomial models. t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
level. Our results imply that a unit variation in the F–K Grade Level of ECB speeches corresponds to an average drop of more than
31 articles on the ECB in the most parsimonious specification, and roughly 8 articles in the most stringent one.
Second, we assess the relationship between communication clarity in ECB press conferences and ECB-related media coverage
around the press conference. The dependent variable is now given by the number of ECB-related articles that were published on
the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window of the ECB press conference. In our analysis, we start by considering the F–K Grade Level of all the
textual content of the press conference and subsequently distinguish between the textual content of the introductory statement (IS)
given by the ECB President and the Q&A session between the President and the journalists attending the press conference. As for
Table 1, our baseline specification is based on a negative binomial model with robust standard errors.
Table 2 presents the marginal effects of our analysis of press conferences, while the full set of results is available in Online
Appendix E (Table A8). In columns (1)-(4), the independent variable is the F–K Grade Level of the entire press conference. In
column (1), the model includes only the measure of (lack of) communication clarity as an explanatory variable and the intercept.
In column (2), we add a control for the announcement of changes in the conventional monetary policy of the ECB. In column (3),
we add controls for changes in the unconventional monetary policy of the ECB. In column (4), we include control for asset price
changes. In column (5), we add time fixed effects using factor variables for the month and year of each press conference. In column
(6), we maintain the specification of column (5) and use the F–K Grade Level of the introductory statement as the main independent
variable. In column (7), we assess the relationship between media coverage and the F–K Grade Level of the Q&A session transcript.
The results show that a higher level of complexity (i.e., a lower level of clarity) of the press conference is negatively associated
with the volume of media coverage on the ECB on press conference day 𝑡 and the day 𝑡 + 1. Importantly, this relationship is not
he product of the inherently higher degree of technicality that may be related to the announcement of new policy measures or the
nformational content proxied by asset price changes. Also, the understandability of the introductory statement of the ECB President
s estimated to have no impact on the amount of articles that journalists write about the ECB on the day of the press conference:
hat drives the results is the clarity of the President’s exchange with the journalists during the Q&A Session. In the most stringent
pecification, a unit variation in the degree of complexity of the press conference is associated with a drop in the volume of ECB
overage of around 64 articles.
Third, we study the relationship between the clarity of ECB digital communications and social media engagement on Twitter.
able 3 presents the marginal effects from negative binomial regression models with robust standard errors. The full set of estimated
oefficients is presented in Online Appendix E (Table A9). In columns (1)-(4), the dependent variable is the engagement rate of each
CB tweet in our dataset. The main independent variable is given by the F–K Grade Level of each tweet. In column (1), the model
ncludes only the F–K Grade Level and the intercept. In column (2), we augment the model with the topic classification obtained
ith the SVM model discussed in Online Appendix D. In column (3), we add a dummy variable indicating the presence of media
ontent (e.g., picture, video, etc.) as a control variable. In column (4), we add time fixed effects, using factor variables for the day9
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ECB tweet complexity and media engagement: Marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Eng. Rate Eng. Rate Eng. Rate Eng. Rate Engagements Impressions
Flesh–Kincaid (Tweets) −0.187*** −0.161*** −0.089*** −0.093*** −3.709** −313.169***
(−6.69) (−5.58) (−3.40) (−3.92) (−2.31) (−3.98)
Observations 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276
Topics     
Media content    
Time fixed effects   
Marginal effects from negative binomial models. t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
Fig. 5. Predicted engagement of ECB speeches, press conferences and tweets conditional on communication complexity. Notes: The visualisations presented by
the different sub-figures are based on, respectively, (a) column (4) of Table 1, (b) column (5) of Table 2 and (c) column (4) of Table 3.
of the week, the month and the year in which a tweet was posted. In columns (5) and (6), we use the same model specification of
column (4), but we consider, respectively, engagements and impressions as dependent variables separately.
The results show that the clarity of central bank digital communications is a significant and strong predictor of social media
engagement. Tweets containing more difficult language generate, on average, a lower number of users interacting with them. This
effect holds when controlling for tweet-specific features and time-varying factors. Our most conservative estimates imply that,
everything else being equal, an ECB tweet with one additional point in its F–K Grade Level is predicted to have at least 4 less
users interacting with it and 300 less users seeing it in their timelines.
Fig. 5 provides a visualisation of the predicted levels of engagement from the three sets of analyses carried out in this section.
Speeches containing clearer language (e.g., F–K Grade Level ≤ 11) are, on average, estimated to be associated with more than 470
news articles on the ECB in the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window in which they are given. The same speech, but with a lower degree of
communication clarity (e.g., F–K Grade Level ≥ 15), is predicted to generate at least 40 articles less over the two days 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1.
The magnitude of this effect is much higher for press conferences. Ceteris paribus, the variation between greater clarity (e.g., F–K10



















Grade Level ≤ 11) and lower clarity (e.g., F–K Grade Level ≥ 15) in press conferences corresponds to a difference in the volume of
coverage on the ECB of more than 200 news articles in the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window of the press conference.
Finally, tweets containing clearer language (e.g., F–K score ≤ 11) are estimated to have, on average, an engagement rate that is
bove 6.5. The engagement rate drops to below 6.25 for tweets with more complex language (i.e., F–K score ≥ 15). As shown in
Online Appendix F (Figure A4), if we consider engagements and impressions as dependent variables, this corresponds to a variation
of around 14 interactions and 1100 impressions between clearer tweets and more complex ones.
5. Placebo test and robustness checks
In this section, we perform a placebo test and discuss the robustness of our results to different model specifications and measures
of communication clarity. First, we focus on ECB speeches and press conferences, and exploit the time-series structure of our dataset
of ECB-related articles to (a) disaggregate the volume of coverage in the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window that we use in our baseline
specification; (b) verify that media coverage is not correlated with communication clarity before the communication event takes
place.
Our placebo test is given by the introduction of the volume of coverage at time 𝑡 − 1 as a separate dependent variable. This
allows us to check that the association between communication clarity and media engagement is not driven by a reverse causality
phenomenon in which the level of the treatment (i.e., communication clarity) is affected by the pre-treatment level of the outcome
variable (i.e., media engagement).
Table 4 presents the marginal effects of the F–K Grade Level of speeches and full press conferences from models in which the
volume of ECB media coverage on, respectively, day 𝑡, 𝑡+1 and 𝑡−1 are taken separately in each model as a dependent variable. In
all cases, we estimate the most stringent specification from Tables 1 and 2, which includes the full set of control variables and time
fixed effects. In columns (1)-(3), we present the results for speeches, while the results for press conferences are shown in columns
(4)-(6).
Table 4
Placebo test: Speeches and press conferences (marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Vt Vt+1 Vt-1 Vt Vt+1 Vt-1
Flesch–Kincaid (Speeches) −3.514* −4.830** 0.754
(−1.68) (−2.51) (0.39)
Flesch–Kincaid (All PC) −44.849*** −32.335** −18.345
(−3.05) (−2.23) (−1.54)
Observations 1,655 1,655 1,655 223 223 223
Controls      
Time fixed effects      
Marginal effects from negative binomial models. t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
The results of Table 4 confirm that our findings are robust to the disaggregation of the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window at the time
of the communication event. The relationship between (lack of) communication clarity and media engagement is estimated to be
particularly strong in terms of magnitude and statistical significance on the day 𝑡+ 1 after an ECB speech. Yet the coefficient of the
F–K Grade Level of speeches remains negative and statistically significant at the 10% level also on day 𝑡. For press conferences, the
agnitude and high statistical significance of the estimated coefficient is almost equivalent in the two cases in which we consider
CB coverage on day 𝑡 and day 𝑡+ 1. Instead, confirming our expectations, for both speeches and press conferences, the F–K Grade
evel of the communication event at time 𝑡 is estimated to be non-statistically significant in models considering the volume of ECB
overage at time 𝑡 − 1. This reassures us about the validity of our results in the presence of potential threats of reverse causality.
Second, Table 5 presents the marginal effects of different analyses of the relationship between ECB speech and press conference
omplexity and the volume of ECB media coverage. In particular, we extend the results obtained in Tables 1 and 2 by: (a) making
se of the FOG Index (discussed in Section 3.1) instead of the F–K Grade Level; and (b) making use of OLS regression models instead
f negative binomial regression models. In all cases, we estimate the most stringent specification including the full set of control
ariables and time fixed effects. In column (1), we assess the effects of clarity of communication in ECB speeches on ECB media
overage using the FOG Index and a negative binomial model. In column (2), we resort to the F–K Grade Level, but make use of
n OLS regression. In column (3), we use the FOG Index in an OLS regression framework. In column (4), we study the effects of
larity of communication in ECB press conferences on ECB media coverage using the FOG Index and a negative binomial model. In
olumn (5), we resort to the F–K Grade Level and OLS, while we use the FOG Index and OLS in column (6).
The results of Table 5 show that our findings are mostly robust across different specifications. The use of the FOG Index and
LS regressions does not substantially alter the conclusions reached in the previous section. Greater complexity in the speeches and
ress conferences of the ECB is consistently associated with lower volumes of ECB media coverage, with this effect being precisely
stimated across the different specifications. The only exception is given by the model using OLS to estimate the effect of the F–K
rade Level on media coverage in the two-day [𝑡, 𝑡 + 1] window: in this case, the magnitude of the coefficient is not substantially
ltered, but the coefficient is imprecisely estimated.11
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Robustness checks: Speeches and press conferences (marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model NB OLS OLS NB OLS OLS




FOG (All PC) −58.67** −51.22*
(−2.52) (−1.72)
Flesch–Kincaid (All PC) −50.87
(−1.53)
Observations 1,655 1,655 1,655 223 223 223
Controls      
Time fixed effects      
Marginal effects from negative binomial models (columns 1 and 4) and OLS (columns 2, 3, 5 and 7).
t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
Table 6
Robustness checks and additional analyses: Tweets (marginal effects).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model NB OLS OLS NB NB NB
Dependent variable Eng. Rate Eng. Rate Eng. Rate Engagements Impressions Likes Rate
FOG (Tweets) −0.056*** −0.057*** −3.718** −249.098***
(−3.45) (−3.03) (−2.94) (−3.79)
Flesch–Kincaid (Tweets) −0.094*** −.0003
(−3.22) (−0.11)
Observations 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276
Controls      
Time fixed effects      
Marginal effects from negative binomial models (columns 1, 4, 5 and 6) and OLS (columns 2 and 3).
t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
∗ 𝑝 < 0.10, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01.
Finally, in Table 6, we extend the analysis of the relationship between digital communication clarity and social media
engagement. Similar to Table 5, we assess the sensitivity of our findings when operationalising the complexity variable with the FOG
Index and when using OLS regressions. Also, we can here extend the set of dependent variables considered in our assessment of the
effects of communication clarity. In columns (1)-(3), the main dependent variable we consider is the tweet-level engagement rate.
In columns (4) and (5), we verify our results by decomposing the engagement rate into its two components, namely engagements
and impressions, and considering them as dependent variables separately. In column (6), we extend the analysis to consider whether
communication clarity has an effect on the likes rate, namely the amount of likes a tweet receives, standardised by the number of
impressions. We use the FOG Index in columns (1), (3), (4) and (5), while sticking to the F–K Grade Level in columns (2) and (6).
In columns (2) and (3), we use OLS regressions, while the other columns present results from negative binomial models.
We do not detect significant sensitivity of our results to different specifications in the analysis of ECB digital communications. The
complexity variable remains a significant predictor of the level of engagements and views obtained by ECB tweets independent of its
operationalisation. Interestingly, while these results point to a strong link between communication clarity and media engagement,
column (6) of Table 4 provides suggestive evidence that greater clarity and engagement might not directly translate into greater
positive attitudes towards the ECB. Indeed, there appears to be no sizeable and significant correlation between the F–K Grade Level
of ECB tweets and the amount of likes they receive. We leave the exploration of the relationship between communication clarity
and public favourability for future research.
6. Conclusion
Despite radical changes in central bank communication over the past decade, the language of central bankers often remains
too difficult to understand for non-specialised audiences. Several key policymakers and privileged observers have been vocal about
it, highlighting that the communications of central bankers are inaccessible to the large majority of citizens. A growing consensus
around the need for clearer communications in the realm of central banking is starting to emerge, but a systematic assessment of
the effects of communication clarity on engagement has so far been missing.
Focusing on the clarity of ECB communication activities, this paper has provided evidence that clearer communication is strongly
and robustly correlated with a higher degree of engagement of journalists and social media users. Communication clarity is an
important predictor of the volume of articles on the ECB published immediately after ECB communication activities. Moreover,12
clarity plays an important role in explaining the social media engagement generated by ECB digital communications on Twitter.










































In other words, journalists and social media users tend to talk less about, and engage less with, the ECB when its language is
more difficult to understand. These results hold when controlling for several potential confounders and when addressing the reverse
causality issue that might be generated by communication clarity being sensitive to pre-existent levels of ECB coverage. The findings
are robust across different model specifications and operationalisations of communication clarity.
Taken together, these findings have significant implications for the communication policy of central banks. The ECB is a very
ood case in point in this regard. ECB President Christine Lagarde has never hidden her willingness to promote clear and effective
ommunications with the citizens of the euro area. For instance, during her first hearing as ECB President before the European
arliament in December 2019, she stressed the importance of this objective by saying: ‘‘It is important to me that our focus on
onnecting with the people we serve continues and grows stronger — in particular by improving the ways in which we communicate
ith the general public’’ (ECB 2019).
Consistent with other recent contributions (e.g., Bholat et al. 2019), our results provide support for policy efforts aimed at
educing the degree of complexity of central bank communications targeted at the public. Yet, as pointed out by Istrefi (2019b), it
s also important to acknowledge that there may be tradeoffs between increased communication, simplicity and the need to convey
orrectly central bank messages. For instance, various authors have suggested that limits to the transparency and availability of
ommunications may exist (Cukierman and Meltzer 1986; Morris and Shin 2002). Also, while evidence in favour of the institutional
ransparency of central banks has accumulated over the years (see Geraats 2002; van der Cruijsen and Eijffinger 2007), it is by
o means taken for granted that benefits of clearer central bank communications always outweigh their costs (e.g., in reputational
erms). Thus, a key challenge for central banks in the 21st century is to design communications that are both accurate and simple.
y shedding new light on the effects of clarity in the communication of central banks, this paper constitutes an attempt to advance
he lively debate on the appropriate balance between different features of central bank communication.
The evidence provided in this paper is especially relevant in light of the strategy review launched by the ECB in January
020, which is still ongoing at the time of writing. This review involves several pillars of the ECB’s policy strategy, including its
ommunication with the public. The review process has been underpinned by several listening activities with citizens, civil society
rganisations, think tanks and other relevant actors. The first results of these listening exercises point to a strong societal demand
or clearer and more accessible communications by the ECB. For instance, evidence from the ‘‘ECB Listens Portal’’, an online survey
onducted with 3960 euro area citizens, indicates that simple language and concrete examples are often suggested by the public as
ays to improve the ECB’s communication (ECB 2021). Our paper offers additional motivation to address this societal demand.
Future research may extend the analysis of this paper in several interesting directions. In our view, two are particularly promising.
irst, this paper has focused on the effects of the clarity of central bank communication, while it has said very little about its
eterminants. Future research should advance our understanding of how central bankers adapt their language based on different
argeted audiences, and how different features of central bank communication are responsive to the changing macroeconomic and
olitical environment. Second, it is important to push forward the analysis of the effects produced by different features of central
ank communication. As successfully shown by recent studies (e.g., Haldane and McMahon 2018; Kryvtsov and Petersen 2021; Baerg
t al. 2021), survey and lab experiments promise to be extremely useful tools to assess the impact of central bankers’ language on
itizen attitudes, expectations and behaviour.
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